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ATTORNEYS' FEES AS RESPONSE COSTS UNDER
THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL
RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B)
I. INTRODUCTION
Upon enacting the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA), the 96th Congress created a framework for litigating the
environmental concerns of our communities.' CERCLA seeks to "assur[e] that those
responsible for any damage, environmental harm, or injury from chemical poisons bear
the costs of their actions;... [and] provid[e] adequate compensation to those who
have suffered economic, health, or other damages. 2 Although relatively successful in
accomplishing these goals, the effectiveness of CERCLA continues to be restricted by
the inability of courts to consistently interpret the language of the act.?
Section 9607(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA allows an innocent party to recover the "nec-
essary costs" incurred while responding to the harmful actions of other par ties.4 The
circuits are split whether attorneys' fees are within the definition of "necessary costs"
under § 9607(a)(4)(B).' Although most of the circuits which have addressed the issue
1. See, H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sdss. pt. 1, at 20-21 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6122-23.
The failure to properly dispose of hazardous waste costs the public millions. An EPA report estimates
that it will cost between $13.1 and $22.1 billion to clean up all hazardous waste that pose a danger
to public health and the environment. Public opposition to new sites, caused by improper disposal in
the past, is growing. Until such opposition can be lessened by demonstrating that hazardous wastes can
be disposed of safely, future sites may have to be located on Federal and State lands.
2. See, S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 13 (1980).
Other purposes include: providing a fund to finance response action where a liable party does not
clean up, cannot be found, or cannot pay the costs of cleanup and compensation; basing the fund
primarily on contributions from those who have been generically associated with such problems in the
past and who today profit from products and services associated with such substances; and providing
ample Federal response authority to help clean up hazardous chemical disasters.
3. See, Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 1, 2 (1982) ("In the
instance of 'Superfund' legislation, a hastily assembled bill and a fragmented legislative history add to
the usual difficulty of discerning the full meaning of the law."). Numerous courts have found the
language of CERCLA ambiguous and confusing. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 363
(1986) ("CERCLA is not a model of legislative draftsmanship."); United States v. Alcan Aluminum
Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 258 (3d. Cir. 1992) ("The statute is riddled with inconsistencies and redundan-
cies."); State of Colorado v. United States Dept. of the Interior, 880 F.2d 481, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(finding the statutory language ambiguous as to its intended scope); Walls v. Waste Resource Corp.,
823 F.2d 977, 979 (6th Cir. 1987) ('The plain language of CERCLA is not so plain at all but rather
shrouded in considerable ambiguity.").
4. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) reads:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses set
forth in subsection (b) of this section - any person who accepts or accepted any haz-
ardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or
sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release
which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable
for any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with
the national contingency plan.
5. The circuit courts that allow awards of attorneys' fees include: General Elec. Co. v. Litton
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agree that awarding attorneys' fees would further the goals of CERCLA,6 a majority
of these circuits do not find the requisite statutory language to read attorneys' fees into
the definition of necessary costs.' Thus, Congress should amend § 9607(a)(4)(B) to
specifically include reasonable attorneys' fees among the necessary costs recoverable
by innocent parties who initiate response activities.
II. CIRCUITS DENYING AWARDS OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilder-
ness Society, the First, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have denied awards of attorneys' fees
under § 9607(a)(4)(B).' Alyeska reaffirmed the general principle that prevailing liti-
gants are not entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees from opposing parties.9 Moreover,
the Supreme Court pointed out that Congress has made provisions for attorneys' fees
in specific statutes, thereby emphasizing Congress' exclusive power to allow such
awards.'0
Upon concluding that Congress did not explicitly authorize attorneys' fees under
§ 9607(a)(4)(B), the Ninth Circuit interpreted Alyeska as prohibiting the judiciary from
implying Congressional intent to award such fees." The First and Tenth Circuits have
made the same ruling; however, they assert that Congressional authorization to allow
awards of attorney's fees under § 9607(a)(4)(B) would promote the goals and purposes
of CERCLA.n In Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, the Ninth Circuit interpreted
Indus. Automation Sys., 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 937 (1991); United
States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478 (8th Cir. 1992); and Donahey v. Bogle, 987 F.2d
1250 (6th Cir. 1993). The circuit court decisions that do not allow awards of attorneys' fees include:
In re Hemingway Transp., 993 F.2d 915 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 126 L.Ed. 251 (1993);
Stanton Rd. Assoc. v. Lohrey Enter., 984 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1993); Key Tronic Corp. v. United
States, 984 F.2d 1025 (9th Cir.) cert. granted, cert. dismissed, _ U.S. _, 114 S.Ct. 652 (1993);
Louisiana-Pac. Corp. v. Asarco, 6 F.3d 1332 (9th Cir. 1993); FMC Corp. v. Aero Indus., 998 F.2d
842 (10th Cit. 1993).
6. See infra notes 12, 15-16.
7. See infra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
8. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (reversing the D.C. Court of
Appeals, awarding attorneys' fees to the Wilderness Society against Alyeska Pipeline Service based
upon the court's equitable powers and the theory that respondents were entitled to fees because they
were performing the services of a "private attorney general."). See In re Hemingway, supra note 5;
Stanton Road, supra note 5; Key Tronic, supra note 5; and FMC Corp., supra note 5. See also,
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967); F.D. Rich Co. v. Unit-
ed States For the Use of Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 128-131 (1974); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1,
4 (1973).
9. Id. at 247.
10. Id. at 260 ("What Congress has done, however, while fully recognizing and accepting the
general rule, is to make specific and explicit provisions for the allowance for attorneys' fees under
selected statutes granting or protecting various federal rights.").
11. See Stanton Rd. Assoc. v. Lohrey Enter., 984 F.2d 1015, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 1993) (reversing
the award of attorneys' fees under § 9607.). See also, Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 984 F.2d
1025, 1027 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that CERCLA does not authorize an award of attorneys' fees in a
private response cost recovery action; thus, the court lacks the authority to enter an award for the
legal expenses incurred by Key Tronic in searching for other potentially responsible parties.), cert.
granted, cert. dismissed, -.U.S. _ 114 S.Ct. 652 (1993).
12. In re Hemingway Trans., 993 F.2d 915, 935 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that although a strong
case may be made that attorney fee awards in private cost recovery actions promote CERCLA's reme-
dial aims, that case is one for the legislative venue.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 303 (1993). See also,
FMC Corp. v. Aero Indus., 998 F.2d 842, 848 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that awards of attorneys' fees
would further the goals of CERCLA by encouraging private parties to assume the financial responsibil-
ity of cleanup by allowing them to seek recovery from others. The Tenth Circuit remanded to the dis-
trict court to determine whether any of the non-litigation attorneys' fees were necessary to the contain-
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Alyeska as applying specifically to attorneys' fees, allowing a district court to deter-
mine if other litigation expenses could be recovered under CERCLA."3 The court
seeks to implement the goals of CERCLA by awarding recovery of economic losses to
the prevailing party, including as much of litigation costs as possible within the bound-
aries of controlling precedent.
III. CIRCUITS FAVORING THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
The Sixth and Eighth Circuits find sufficient authority in the language of §
9607(a)(4)(B) to award attorneys' fees to prevailing litigants. 4 In General Electric
Co. v. Litton Industrial Automation Systems, Inc.,5 the Eighth Circuit found that
attorneys' fees and expenses are necessarily incurred when private parties enforce
CERCLA, and "it would strain the statutory language to the breaking point to read
them out of the 'necessary costs' that § 9607(a)(4)(B) allows private parties to recov-
er.' 6 In addition, General Electric held that awarding attorneys' fees is consistent
with two of the main purposes of CERCLA - prompt cleanup of hazardous wastes
and imposition of all cleanup costs on the responsible party. 7 If a private party is
forced to bear the burden of attorneys' fees, the purposes of CERCLA would be un-
dermined." The litigation costs could easily approach or even exceed the response
cost, thereby serving as a disincentive to clean the site. 9
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Environmental litigation often involves valuable property and several potentially
responsible parties. An individual who takes the initiative to cleanup a site, whether
responsible or not, incurs incredible expense. Beyond the costs of engineers, environ-
mental assessment firms, and actual cleanup crews, the individual expends a consider-
able amount of money on attorneys' fees. These fees include the time necessary to
draw contracts and locate potentially responsible parties, as well as the litigation ex-
penses required to hold responsible parties accountable for their actions. Once the
responsible parties are discovered, CERCLA § 9607(a)(4)(B) allows the innocent party
ment and cleanup of hazardous releases and therefore recoverable as necessary costs.). See also, infra
notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
13. Louisiana-Pac. Corp. v. Asarco, 6 F.3d 1332, 1342 (9th Cir. 1993) (disallowing attorneys'
fees, while not reversing the award of litigation expenses under CERCLA).
14. See supra note 5.
15. General Elec., supra note 5. (requiring Litton to pay G.E. cleanup costs for cyanide-based
electroplating wastes dumped on land eventually purchased by G.E. "Section 9614(f) authorizes contri-
bution between parties liable under section 9607. Such contribution is not helpful to the less responsi-
ble party if it does not encompass a substantial portion of the financial burden imposed by the more
responsible party's hazardous conduct. Therefore, section 9613 must be read to include all of a party's
incurred costs. Legal fees are indisputably one of these costs.").
16. Id. at 1421. See also, Donahey, supra note 5 (quoting Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759
F.Supp. 692, 710 (D.Kan. 1991)):
By providing private parties with a federal cause of action for the recovery of necessary
expenses in the cleanup of hazardous wastes, Congress intended 107 as a powerful in-
centive for these parties to expend their own funds initially without waiting for the re-
sponsible persons to take actions. The court can conceive of no surer method to defeat
this purpose than to require private parties to shoulder the financial burden of the very
litigation that is necessary to recover these costs.
17. Id. See also, Gopher Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co., 955 F.2d 519, 527 (8th Cir. 1992) (upholding
the district court's decision awarding Gopher $559,380.52 in attorneys' fees).
18. Id. at 1422.
19. Id.
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to recover necessary response costs.
The Sixth and Eighth Circuits have awarded attorneys' fees as necessary re-
sponse costs under § 9607(a)(4)(B), interpreting such awards to be consistent with
Congressional intent and necessary to implement the goals and purposes of
CERCLA. ° The First, Ninth, and Tenth circuits have not awarded attorneys' fees,
perceiving themselves limited by the Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska;2  however,
these circuits recognize that awarding attorneys' fees under § 9607(a)(4)(B) would
further the intended purposes of CERCLA.22
To encourage early action by private citizens, attorneys' fees must be compen-
sable as necessary response costs. Otherwise, private citizens will wait for a court
determination of CERCLA responsibility before initiating cleanup activities. A pre-
vailing innocent party that cleans up the damage suffers considerable economic hard-
ship without complete relief from the party that caused the damage. If Congress wants
the responsible parties to pay for the damage that they have caused, while still encour-
aging early clean-up actions, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) must be amended to include
all reasonable attorneys' fees as response costs under CERCLA. An effective amend-
ment of § 9607(a)(4)(B) would read:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defens-
es set forth in subsection (b) of this section - any person who accepts or accepted
any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities or sites
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release
which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be
liable for any other necessary costs of response, including reasonable attorneys'
fees, incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency
plan ......
This amendment would give effect to the statute's purposes and resolve the split in the
circuits.
Laura M. Salava"
20. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
21. See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
22. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
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